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GROUND RENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA.
No. I.
The law applicable to ground rents, as they exist in Pennsylvania-a subject which, though perhaps, more particularly interesting to the Pennsylvania lawyer-cannot, we think, prove altogether
unattractive to the profession at large. We are not aware that
ground rents, eo nomine, and.as a species of real estate, exist in any
other state of the Union; but, being in their nature a common law
rent, a brief exposition of some portions of the law in reference to
them, must, we believe, be of practical utility, wherever the decisions
of the Supreme judicial tribunal of this state, are at all regarded.
A rent reserved to himself and his heirs by the grantor of land
in fee simple, out of the land conveyed, is termed in Pennsylvania,
a ground rent.1
A ground rent, as already intimated, is real estate, and in a ease
of intestacy goes to the heir.2 In Bosler vs. Kuhn, Ch. Justice
Gibson says of this rent, that "like rent granted for owelty of partition, or in lieu of dower, it partakes of the realty, and has no touch:
of personal responsibility in its complexion,"and *that "even where
See Kenege vs. Elliott, 9 W. 262; Bosler vs. Kuhn, 8 W. & S. 185.
Cobb vs. biddle, 2 H. 444.
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the reservation is attended by a clause of distress, the land is excluively the debtor." It is not, of course intended by this that the
grantee of the land is not personally liable upon his express covw
enant to pay the rent, or in an action of debt or assumpsit, where
there is no such covenant, and that the judgment is de terrie. But
we apprehend Chief Justice Gibson's meaning to be, that the obligation to pay this rent arises from no mere personal covenant to pay,
but by force of the reservation of the rent and acceptance of the
land; the forner of which is by words exclusively of the grantor
himself, but by which the grantee becomes bound upon acceptance
of the estate.2 The ground rent is created by the reservationand
not by the covenant to pay; the consideration for the payment of
the rent is the enjoyment of the land,3 there is, therefore, no personal responsibility independent of that enjoyment, and hence the
land is termed the detor.' "The covenant," says Chief Justice
Gibson, in the case cited, "is but an accessory, the rent being the
principal." The covenant "is a security for the performance'of a
collateralact. Littleton says (sec. 216) that before the statute Quid
enptores terrarum, (and this is the law in Pennsylvania, as that
statute is not in force here)5 "if a man had made a feoffinent in fee
sinple, by deed or without deed, yielding to him and to his heirs a
certain rent, this was a rent service, and for this he might have
diatrained of common right. And if there were no reservation of
any rout nor of any service, yet the feoffee held of the feoffer by the
same service as the feoffer did hold over of his lord next paramount."
Pointing out distinctly, what Ch. J. Gibson has stated in such strong
language, that the rent is due by virtue of the reservation and enjoyment of the land, without regard to personal covenants for its
payment.
ItSaMaule vs. Weavbr, 7 Barr, 8'1.

2

fles Co. Litt. 144, a.
vs. Sergeant, 1 Wh. 887; Warner v8. Caulk, 8 Wh. 197.
4
cSorpletely is the enjoyment of the land the consideration for the payment of
the rent,. that the grantee of the land is bound to pay the rent only as long as the
title he receives from the grantor proves sufficient to protect and secure him in that
enjoyment; "St. Mary's Church, vs. Miles, 1 Wh. 285 per Kennedy, J.; Garrison vs.
Moore, 9 Leg. lat. 2, D. C. C.C. of P.; Nsgleb vs. Ingersoll, 7 Barr, 18561ngersoll v. Sergeant, 1 Wh. 837.
3 Ingersoll
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The interest of the owner of the rent "is considered as an estate
altogether distinct, and of a very different nature from that which
the owner of the land his in the land itself. Each is considered
the owner of a fee simple estate. The one has an estate of inheritance in the rent, and the other has an estate of inheritance in the
land out of which the rent issues. The one is an incorporeal inheritance in fee, and the other is a corporeal inheritance in fee."' The
owner of the rent is not liable for any part of the taxes assessed
upon the land out .of which the rent issues, 2 and each is made by
our acts of assembly separate and distinct subjects of taxation.8
Being real estate, ground rents are, of course, bound by a judgment, and a mortgage of them comes within the purview of the
recording acts'of this State.
Although they are frequently called, by conveyancers and others,
rents chlarge, and although in drawing the groimd' rent deed they
are invariably treated as such-the land being expressly 6harged
with the right of distress-yet since the case of Ingeraollvs. ASergeant,4 it has been settled they are rents service. A brief view of
the distinguishing characteristics of a rent service, and the mode
in which they have been affected by the statute Quid emptores
terrarum, will exhibit the principles upon which the law, asthus
settled, rests.
A rent service, which was the 6nly kind of rent originally known
to the common law,5 arose out of and was dependent upon the
system of tenuresg which existed under the feudal law, viz: that of
subinfeudation.6 Anciently, whenever land was held by homage
or fealty, or both, and rent, the rent was a rent service. Hliomage
and the oath of fealty or fidelity were the consequence of tenure,
2Irwin vs. Bank of United States, 1 Bar, 349, per Kennedy, J.
2
Philada. Lib. Co. vs. Inghamt, 1 Wh. 72. Franciscus vs. Reigart 4 W. 98.
sIrwin vs. Bank of U. S. Supra.
41 Wh. 337, see also Franciscus 58. Reigart, 4 W. 98; and Kenege vs. Elliott, 9 W.
262.
5 Thomas' note to Co. Litt. vol. 1, p. 442.
6 2 Inst. 505, Bacon's Abr. Rent, 5, Gilb. Rents, 15.
7

Litt. Sec. 213.
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and were due by the tenant to the lord of whom he held.his lands.'
Under the system of subinfeudation the alienee of land held it of
his alienor; fealty was therefore due by the former to -the latter,
and a rent reserved upon such an alienation was a rent service.
The character of the rent therefore as a rent 8erviee, depended
2
upon the fact of tenure. The statute Quid emptoretrrarumhad,
the effect of abolishing this tenure upon all sales of land in fee. It
enacted that upon all sales of land. held- in fee simple the feoffee
should hold the same of the chief lord of 'the fee by such services
and customs as .his- feoffor held. Upon the construction of this
statute it was held that whenever, the whole estate was not conveyed,
but a reversion remained in the alienor, the alieneawas notfeoffatus.
within the act, and the reversion was sufficient to support the tnure
of him; sales, -therefore, in which the entire. fee was. parted with,
3
alone came within the provisions of the statute. After the statute
quid emptores, consequently, in England the alienee of land in fee,
not holding of his alienor as before, but of the chief lord. of the fee
-there being no tenure of, and therefore no -fealty or service due
such alienor-a rent reserved by him was no longer a rent service.
In the case of _tngeroll vs. Sergeant, it was held that the statute
quia emytores was not in force in Pennsylvania, that the law as it
stood in England prior to that statute consequently prevailed here,
and ground rents, being rents reserved upon a conveyance in fee,
were therefore -rents service.
This case must be regarded as establishing the existence- of the
system of tenures in Pennsylvania ;4 we find it stated, nevertheless,
by a distihguished jurist, in a work published two years subsequently,
that on this point different opinions are entertained, some holding
that the property of the tenant in fee simple since the revolution
is allodial.5
A ground rent, being a rent service, is attended by all the inci505, Bac. Abr. Rents, 5; Gl~b. Rents, 15.
uInst.
2 18 Ed. 8, S. 1 Westm. 3.

Litt. 214, 216; Bao. Abr. Rent, 6; Ghb. IRent, 16.
4 See also Robb vs. Beaver, 2 W. &S. 126; 9 Watts, 262.
Sergeant's Land Laws of Pennsylvania, 200.
3

GROUND RENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA.

dents of that species of rent. It is distrainable of common right,'
and the special clause of distress usually inserted in the ground
rent deed, is, therefore, inoperative and altogether unnecessary.
So, also, it may be apportioned, and questions of much practical
interest growing out of this quality have arisen.
In the case of Ingersoll vs. Sergeant, a portion of -the land out
of which the rent issued had been sold to a third person, "clear of
all liens and incumbrances whatsoever." Subsequently that portion,
in consideration of such sale and a nominal sum, was released from
the ground rent, and the question was whether the release- did not
extinguish the entire rent. If the rent was a rent charge, it did;
but if a rent servicei it did not: and upon the ground already stated,
it was held to be a rent service and the entire rent not extinguished,
but that the portion of land released was discharged from the rent,
leaving the remaining part subject to its due proportion of the rent.
In this case the part released having been owned by a different
.person from -that to whom the remainder belonged, and the entire
rent not being extinguished by the release, justice would seem to
require an apportionment. But if it be the legal effect of a release
of part of the land from the rent, that the rent is ipso facto apportioned and reduced pro tanto, then the same consequence must
follow if part of the land be released when the whole belongs to the
same individual-this, too, though the release be made upon a
nominal consideration. And such is undoubtedly the law.
That the rent -is apportioned where the owner of the rent purchases part of the land, is well settled. Littleton says (see. 222)
"If a man which hath a rent service purchase a parcel of the land
out of which the rent is issuing, this shall not extinguish all, but for
the parcel. For a rent service in such case may be apportioned
according to the value of the land." The reason is this: a rent ser-.
vice is given as a return for the possession of the land; upon the
enjoyment of the land, therefore, depends the obligation to pay the
rent. If the owner of the rent therefore purchases part of the laAd,
the tenant no longer enjoying that portion, is not liable to pay rent
for it; so much of the rent as issues out of that portion is conseI Co. Litt. 142 a; and See 9 Watts, 262.
Cuthbert va. Kuhn, 3 Wh. 365.
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quently extinguished.' In the case of a release of part of the land
from the rent-although the tenant continues to enjoy the whole of
the land out of which the rent was reserved, yet the rent would seem
to be apportioned upon precisely the same reasoning, though put
in a somewhat different form-a rent service is given as a return
for the possession of the land; upon the enjoyment of the land,
therefore, depends the obligation to pay the rent, consequently if a
parpt of the land be released from the rent, so much of the rent is
extinguished, as upon the enjoyment of the remainder of the land
depends only the obligation to pay that portion of the rent.2 A release of part of the land from the rent is equivalent, to releasing
the tenant from any obligation to make a return for the possession
of the land released, and according to Ch. J. Gibson, in Cuthbert vs.
Kuhn, 3 Wh.. 365, "a rent extinguished in part of the land can be
thrown entire on the residue, only *by what is in sub8tance afresah
grant." Certainly a release cannot be considered as afresh grant
because made upon a nominal consideration. Although the party
enjoys the land and has given no actual consideration for the release,
yet'the nominal sum named is the legal considerati6n, and there is
no consideration whatever for throwing the entire rent upon the
residue of the land, or from which to imply a fresh grant.
Unquestionably the parties may agree that the entire rent shall
issue out of the remainder of the land. But what would be the
effect of such agreement upon the rent? Would not the agreement
amount "in 8ustance to afresk grant"? And if so, what becomes
of the character of the rent? Is it any longer a rent service? Is
it not converted into a rent charge,-or rent sce as it shall or shall
not be accompanied by the clause of distress?' It assuredly would
seem not to be the same rent. The original rent issued partly out
of other ground; and this by construction of law upon.the contract.
The parties can scarcely, by a new contract, withdraw the rent
from any given portion of the land into any other portion and there
1S 2 BL Corn .41; Warner vs. Caulk, 3 Wh. 197; Cuthbert vs. Kuhn. 3 Wh.
365; Ingersoll vs. Sergeant, I--Wh. 352; St. Mary's Church vs. Miles, 1 Wh. 235.
2
,'ee Ingersoll vs. Sergeant, 1 Wh. 353; Cutbbert vs. Kuhn, 3 Wh. 365; Warner vs.

Caulk, 3 Wh. 197; Garrison vs. Moore, 9 Leg. Int. 2 D. C. C. C. of P. ; Naglee
Ingersoll, 7 Barr, 185.
-

vs.
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concentrate the entire rent. If they could they might thus burthen
land worth much more than its share of the original rent, to its
entire value, to the Idestruction of incumbrances attaching subsequently to the creation of the original rent and prior to the concentration of it in the portion.
If the owner of the rent releases part of the land, so much of that
rent is destroyed, and the parties can only agree that the same
amount of rent shall issue out of the remainder, and this " only by
what is in substance a fresh grant." And what is this but a rent
charge or rent seek, as the land shall happen to be or not to be charged
with the right of distress? It is a new and different rent created by
the owner of the land, not by conveying the land and reserving the
rent, but by giantingthe rent out of the land, which he holds in fee.
It is true that in the case of an apportionment arising from a release
of part of the land from the rent, or a purchase of part of the land by
the owner of the rent, or the taking of part of the land for public use
as in Cuthbet vs. Kuhn, or by payment of a sum of money to the
owner of the rent, the reduced rent, after apportionment, is not the
rent as ariginally reserved, inasmuch as it differs in amount, but it
is, nevertheless, part of the same rent originally reserved. It is
not a rent created by the act of apportionment; while in the case of
the entire rent thrown on part, the additional rent, at least, which
that part is made to bear, is plainly a new rent issuing out of that
part: and if so, if the entire rent does not cease to be a rent service;
the additional rent would appear to be a rent charge or rent seek, and
the part is encumbered with two distinct rents, the one a rent service
and the other a rent charge or rent seek, or if, by reason of the
entirety of the contract, they are to be deemed one entire rent, it
is either a rent charge, or it is a rent composed of elements, utterly
incapable of assimilation, presenting a piebald production altogetheran anomaly in the law.
In the cases of apportionment mentioned, arising from a release of
part of the land &c.,-inshort those resulting from operation of law,
equity has jurisdiction to decree .an apportionment, but the proportions must be settled by a jury.'
I Cuthbert vs. Kuhn, 3 Wh, 357; Ingersoll vs. Sergeant, 1 Wh. 837.
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In Ingersoll vs. Sergeant Mr. Justice Kennedy, after adverting
to the law that where rent is incident to the reversion and the reversion has been divided and sold in separate parcels to different
vendees, each is entitled to sue or distrain for his respective portion
of the rent corresponding with his proportion of the reversion, seems
to intimate that a ground rent is divisible in the same manner, and
that a father may divide it among his -children, or sell a part of it
to answer the exigencies of his family. The conclusion appears
logical. The owndr of the reversion may divide it among any numBer of persons, and the tenant is .bound to pay to each his portion of
the rent corresponding with his proportion of the reversion; thatis,
in other words, the owner of the rent may apportion it among.as
many as he pleases by dividing the reversion to -whichit is incident,
and each has a separate and distinct right of action against the
tenant for his portion. So, in the case of a ground rent, the principle is the same, and the owner of the rent, it would seem, should
possess the right of apportioning it among any number of persons,
giving to each a distinct and apportioned rent, certain in amount,
so as to create several rents instead of one, and for -which each
could separately sue or distrain. We perceive no distinction between the two cases. The rule, however, in both is wanting in reciproc.ity, for in neither could the party liable for the 5ent-the
lessee in the one case, and the owner of the fee in the other-apportion the rent by assigning or conveying part of the land, (except, of
.course, to the owner of the rent himself,) though the purchaser
would take, subject to a proportional part of the rent.At law the legal ownership of these two estates-that in the rent
and that in the land out of which it issues, can co-exist only while
they are held by different persons or in different rights, for the
moment they unite in one person in the same right, the rent is
merged and extinguished.' In equity, however, this doctrine is subject to very great qualification.
I See as to last.point, Nailer vs. Stanley, 10 S. & R. 450.
2 Phillips vs. Bonsall, 2 Binn. 142, S. 0. 8 Y. 128; Atwater vs. Lloya, 8 r. L J.
282; Penington vs. Coats, 6 Wh. 882; Doughqrty vs. Jack, 5 W. 457.
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A merger is not favored in equity and the doctrine there is that,
although in some cases, where the legal estates unite in the same
person, in the same right, a merger will take place. againsmt the intention of the party whose interests are united,' yet, as a general
rule, the intention, actual or presumed, of such party will govern;
and where no intention is expressed, if it appears most for his advantage that a merger should not take place, such will be presumed
to have. been his intention; and that it is only in cases where it is
perfectly indifferent to the party thus interested that, in equity, a
merger occurs. 2 Even at law (where, however, mergers are also
said to tbe odious) if the one estate or interest be, legal and the other
equitable, there is no merger.3
A ground rent being a freehold estate, created by deed, and perpetual by the terms of its creation, no mere lapse of time without
demand of payment, raises a presumption that the estate -has been
released.4 In this state, says Mr. Justice Kennedy, in the case just
cited, "We have no statute barring the right of an owner to an
estate consisting of a ground rent through his neglect to assert it;
nor yet to preclude him from recovering the rent itself, after any lapse
of time. It is true that statutes of limitation, embracing legal
estates or legal rights alone, have been extended and applied by
Courts of equity to estates and rights of an equitable character, in
order to guard against 'evils attending the latter description of
estates and :rights similar to those provided for in respect to legal
estates and legal rights by such statutes; but they have never been
extended by either Courts of law or equity, to estates or rights
purely legal, not considered as coming within either the letter,
spirit, or meaning thereof." Courts of equity would, therefore,
have no power' to interpose any limitation that would bar a party of
his right to enjoy a ground rent, the estate in which is purely legal.
This applies to the estate in the rent, and comprehends the future
See HeImbold vs. Man, 4 Wh. 421, and cases there cited.
± Dougherty vs. Jack, 5 W. 457; Moore vs. Harrisburg Bank, 8 W. 146; Helmbold vs Man. 4 Wh. 421; Penington vs.'Coats, 6 Wh. 283; Richards vs. Ayres, 1
W. & S.487.
3 Penington vs. Coats, 6 Wh. 283. 4 St. Mary's Church vs. Miles, 1 Wh. 229.

GROUND RENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA.

payments. As to the arrearages of the rent, they having become
payable, 1"are a mere debt or chose in action, which from lapse of
time a jury might presume had been paid, in the absence of anything tending to show the contrary ;" and this presumption would
include only those airearages which fell due twenty years before
commencement of suit.' Although no presumption of an extinguishment of a ground rent arises from lapse of time and non user, yet
it has been held that-by "1analogy to the act of limitations,"which
makes an adverse enjoyment of twenty-one years, a bar to an action
of ejectment," a jury is required, or at least may be advised by the"
court to infer a grant after an adverse enjoyment for the space of
twenty-one years, that " this is not an absolute presumption, but
one that may be rebutted by accounting for the possession consistently -with the. title existing in another ;-"2 and in Sitoever vs. -Lessee
of Whitman, 6 Binn. 416, it was held that what circumstances will
justify the presumption of a deed, is matter of law, and that it is
the duty of the court to give an opinion whether the facts proved
will justify the presumption.
A word as to the effectupon ground rents of a sale of the land out
of which they issue, for taxes. In Irwin vs. Bank of the United
States,3 1it was held, that a treasurer's sale of ground, as unseated
land, for taxes due and in irrear thereon; did not extinguish the
testate of the proprietor of the ground rent, and that the purchaser
at such sale, therefore, took the land subject to the ground rent;
and the reason given by Mr. Justice Kennedy is, that the estate in
the land and that in the rent are separate estates, each made by
our Acts of Assembly distinct subjects of taxation, and " there is,
therefore, no reason why the collection, or the mode of collecting a
tax assessed upon the one, should have any effect whatever upon
thepther." In Tfager vs. Campbell, 5 Watts, 288, it was held, that a
sale of 'unseated land for taxes divests the lien of a mortgage, and
this because such sale divests the land of incumbrances. Ch. J.
Gibson; delivering the opinion of the court in this case, says: "The
St. Mary's Church vs.
Newman vs. Rutter, 8

Mdes, 1 Wh. 229.
. 56.

3 1 Barr, 49.
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land itself and not the owner of it, is debtor for the public charge;
and it is, therefore, immaterial at the moment of sale what may be
the state of the ownership or how many derivative interests may

have been carved out of it. With this the public has no concern;
they are sold with the land just as a remainder would be sold with
a particular estate," and he adds, "1to say the owner may charge
his land to the extent of its value in the hands of a purchaser, is to
say he may exempt it from taxation altogether. Thus encumbered
it could not be sold. Necessity requires that the public duty should
be held paramount to all others; and if a judicial sale shall clear
the title of incumbrances, there is a more urgent reason that a
treasurer's sale have the same effect." This reasoning as to the
public duty would seem to apply equally to land subjected to a
ground rent, as the owner may convey, reserving a rent to its entire
value, a rack rent, and thus by rendering the land of no value above
the rent, equally " exempt it from taxation altogether." It would
seem no answer to say that the ground rent would be taxed in its
stead, because it may be replied, so may the mortgage, and if this
is a reason for exempting the land in the one case it is equally so in
the other. Nor should a question like this be affected by the accident of the legislature having or not having exercised the right
of taxation in reference to the one or the other of these two species
of property.
But the law makes a distinction between estates and liens; and
as laid down in another case,1 by the same learned judge, "a judicial
sale extinguishes but liens and not estates." The same effect is
attributed, in PaZger vs. Campbelland Irwin vs. Bank of the United
States, to a treasurer's sale; and upon this distinction the ground rent
is saved in the one case and the mortgage divested in the other.2
That a judicial sale does not extinguish estates, cannot be taken
as an universal propoition, but as applicable only to sales under a
I
2

Catlin vs. Robinson, 2 W. 378.
The 4th and 5th sections of the act of January 23d, 1849, (Pamph. Laws, 686,

and see also Perry vs. Brinton, I Harris, 202,) protect ground rents, and a certain class
of mortgages in the city and county of Philadelphia, upon a sale of the land for non
payment of taxes, &c. assessed thereon.
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subsequent lien, for it can scarcely be questioned that a judicial sale
under a prior lien divests a ground rent, as well as all other estates,
created subsequently to the lien. If otherwise, by the creation of
a gronnd rent to the entire value of the land, a prior incumbrance
may be rendered valueless.
In their nature ground rents are perpetual, being reserved to the
grantor of the land and his heirs; and being simply an annual sum
reserved, there is no right in the grantee, or those claiming under
him, to extinguish the rent by the payment of a sum of money in
gross. There is, however, almost invariably, a privilege stipulated
.for in the deed of extinguishing the rent by the payment of a certain sum, within a certain time; in default of which, the rent becomes irredeemable unless at the option of the holder, and the
grantee has no equity, eien, to require an extinguishment of the
rent on tender of the sum fixed.' This sum is usually one of which
the rent would be an annual return of six per cent. or as it is
termed, 16. years' purchase; that is, a sum to which the annual
sum would amount in 16j-years.
The Act of Assembly of April 22, 1850, (Pamph. Laws 553, Sec.
21,) was designed to change this feature in ground rents, by rendering all thereafter created redeemable at any time at th6 pleasure of
the terre tenant. We regard this act as something of a curiosity in its
way, and, being short, we quote it entire, with the design of exhibiting the loose and clumsy manner in which it is drawn. It runs thus:
"From and after the passage of this act, whenever a deed or
other instrument of writing conveying real estate shall be made,
wherein shall be contained a reservation of ground rent to become
perpetual upon the failure of the.purchaser to comply with the conditions therein contained, no such covenant or condition shall be so
construed as to make the said ground rent a perpetual incumberance
upon the said real estate; but it shall and may be lawful for the
purchaser thereof at any time after the said ground rent shall have
fallen due, to pay the full amount of the same, and such payment
shall be a complete discharge of such real estate from the incumbrance aforesaid."
I Matter

of Shoemaker, 1 R. 19.
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. It may be remarked of this act in the first place, that it appears
to be based upon the assumption that ground rents as reserved are
not in their nature erpetual,but are to become so only upon failure
of the purchaser of the land to comply with certain conditions;
whereas, in fact, the reverse is the case; the ground rent as reserved
is perpetual, but a right of extinguishment is given the purchaser
of the land by paying a certain sum within a time limited. Before
the.expiration of this time the ground rent is said to be redeemable,
and afterwards irredeemable,not that it has become perpetual. But,

secondly The Act treats the ground rent as an incumbrance on.
the land; whereas it is an estate and not an incumbrance. The
arrearagesare an incumbrance.
Thirdly. A 'ground rent deed, as usually drawn, contains no
" covenant or condition" that the rent shall "become perpetual
upon the failure of -the purchaser to comply with the condition
therein contained." As we have already stated, the rent, as reserved, is perletual, and there is a right to extinguish it given thegrantee his heirs and assigns, by payment of a certain sum within
a certain time. The act does not even treat the failure to comply
with the conditions as rendering the ground rent perpetual, which,
in a practical point of view, it may perhaps, in some sort be said to
do ; that is, so far as it puts it past the power of the land owner to
extinguish or destroy the rent without the assent of the owner of
the rent. But this would be far-from an accurate mode of expression.
.Fourthly. The act gives to the "purchaser" the right of extinguishment; and it would appear from the context, as though by this
was meant the purchaser named in the ground rent deed. If so,
does the right pass to his vendee and those claiming under him?
Fifthly. The act gives to the purchaser the right "at any time
after the said ground rent shall have fallen due, to pay the full

amount of the same," in discharge of the land. Here, by the context, the ground rent mentioned is the ground rent reserved,to wit, the
annual sum, and according to a correct construction of the language
of the act, payment of this at any time after it has fallen due shall
discharge the land from the incumbrance of the annual sum due,
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which scarcely required the aid of the act; and unless this language
applies to the annual sum it is appropriate to nothing else, because
nothing relating to the ground rent but this has any 'ful amount,"
either stated with certainty or capable of being reduced to certainty;
there is no principalto a ground rent but the annual sum reserved;
except this therefore,- a ground rent has no "full amount." But
the act was undoubtedly intended to enable the owner of the land
to extinguish the estate in the rent, by paying the gross sum usually
agreed upon as the sum upon the payment of -which, in a specified
time the rent should cease and be extinguished. How has it effected
this? When does this gross sum "fall due ?" We suppose it is
due when it may be demanded. It is, due when, accordiig to the
terms of the contract the party has promised to pa it. • And as
the deed contains no promise by the grantee to pay it, and it can
never be demanded, it never "1falls due." If then, the .purchaser
has only the right of extinguishment at any time after it has fallen
due, the right, we apprehend, will prove of little advantage to him.
Upon the whole, the act declares that a supposed covenant or condition which never had an existence, shall not make a ground rent
a "1
perpetual incumbrance" upon the land; and that the purchaser
of the land may at any time after an event which can never happen, extinguish the rent, (which in this sense has no amount,) by
paying its full amount.
We suppose the act was not designed to affect a ground rent
reserved, where no right of extinguishment is given by the deed,
should such a case occur; but that such a rent would be irredeemable.
The act is, of course, prospective only, affecting none but ground
rents created from and after its passage; but in a few years, its
construction will become of importance in determining the right to
extinguish; perhaps of much more importance than it now is-in determining the value of the rent as an investment.
In a future number, we propose considering the remedies usually
provided in ground rent deeds for the recovery of the arrears.

